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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The automobile industry, a key sector in China’s industrialization and modernization efforts, has 
been developing rapidly since the 1990s. In recent years, China has become the world’s fastest growing 
automotive producer. Annual vehicle output has increased from less than 2 million vehicles in the late 
1990s to 9.5 million in 2008. In terms of production volume in 2008, China has surpassed Korea, France, 
Germany, and the United States, trailing only Japan. A disproportionate share of China’s output was heavy 
vehicles in the 1990s. However, since 2000 China’s growth has been led by an increase in passenger cars, 
which now account for more than 65% of its vehicle production. 
China’s automobile industry has continued to expand despite the global economic downturn. From 
January to October 2009, more than 10 million vehicles were sold in China. If such growth continues, 
China is on its way to becoming world’s largest auto market. 
Unlike Korea or Japan, China’s automotive industry has developed extensively through foreign direct 
investment. This investment has come in the form of alliances and joint ventures between international 
automobile manufacturers and Chinese partners. The international automobile manufacturers are unlikely 
to promote Chinese exports that compete with their own products in other markets. As a consequence, 
the Chinese companies that have expressed a strong interest in exporting cars have not had strong ties to 
foreign car producers and that, consequently, may struggle to meet safety and emission standards in 
industrialized countries. However, if independent producers, such as Geely, can achieve much higher 
standards, they could prove to be a strong international competitor. Ford’s proposed sale of Volvo to 
Geely may help the Chinese company improve its products. 
China exports and imports few motor vehicles. Exports are growing much more rapidly than imports and 
are mostly light trucks and passenger cars shipped to developing country markets. By contrast, Chinese 
auto parts exports are already making inroads into the United States and other developed markets. While 
U.S. motor vehicle trade with China was insignificant in 2008, the United States imported more than $5.5 
billion in parts from China, while it exported about one- eighth of that amount. Many of these imports are 
aimed at the aftermarket, as most of what China now exports to the U.S. market are standard products 
such as brake parts, electrical and electronic parts, and seating and interior trim. But with high rates of 
investment and strong growth in China by the leading U.S. manufacturers of both cars and parts, major 
motor vehicle companies are likely to increase sourcing from China. 
There have been a significant number of trade disputes with China ranging from implementation of 
obligations that were made when China joined the WTO, China’s exchange rate policy, lax trade law 
enforcement, and alleged subsidies to industrial producers. With a bilateral U.S. trade deficit that rose to 
more than $268 billion in 2008, representatives of the Obama administration, as well as many Members 
of Congress, would like to achieve more balance in U.S.-China trade relations. 
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Summary 
The automobile industry, a key sector in China’s industrialization and modernization efforts, has 
been developing rapidly since the 1990s. In recent years, China has become the world’s fastest 
growing automotive producer. Annual vehicle output has increased from less than 2 million 
vehicles in the late 1990s to 9.5 million in 2008. In terms of production volume in 2008, China 
has surpassed Korea, France, Germany, and the United States, trailing only Japan. A 
disproportionate share of China’s output was heavy vehicles in the 1990s. However, since 2000 
China’s growth has been led by an increase in passenger cars, which now account for more than 
65% of its vehicle production. 
China’s automobile industry has continued to expand despite the global economic downturn. 
From January to October 2009, more than 10 million vehicles were sold in China. If such growth 
continues, China is on its way to becoming world’s largest auto market. 
Unlike Korea or Japan, China’s automotive industry has developed extensively through foreign 
direct investment. This investment has come in the form of alliances and joint ventures between 
international automobile manufacturers and Chinese partners. The international automobile 
manufacturers are unlikely to promote Chinese exports that compete with their own products in 
other markets. As a consequence, the Chinese companies that have expressed a strong interest in 
exporting cars have not had strong ties to foreign car producers and that, consequently, may 
struggle to meet safety and emission standards in industrialized countries. However, if 
independent producers, such as Geely, can achieve much higher standards, they could prove to be 
a strong international competitor. Ford’s proposed sale of Volvo to Geely may help the Chinese 
company improve its products.  
China exports and imports few motor vehicles. Exports are growing much more rapidly than 
imports and are mostly light trucks and passenger cars shipped to developing country markets. By 
contrast, Chinese auto parts exports are already making inroads into the United States and other 
developed markets. While U.S. motor vehicle trade with China was insignificant in 2008, the 
United States imported more than $5.5 billion in parts from China, while it exported about one-
eighth of that amount. Many of these imports are aimed at the aftermarket, as most of what China 
now exports to the U.S. market are standard products such as brake parts, electrical and electronic 
parts, and seating and interior trim. But with high rates of investment and strong growth in China 
by the leading U.S. manufacturers of both cars and parts, major motor vehicle companies are 
likely to increase sourcing from China. 
There have been a significant number of trade disputes with China ranging from implementation 
of obligations that were made when China joined the WTO, China’s exchange rate policy, lax 
trade law enforcement, and alleged subsidies to industrial producers. With a bilateral U.S. trade 
deficit that rose to more than $268 billion in 2008, representatives of the Obama administration, 
as well as many Members of Congress, would like to achieve more balance in U.S.-China trade 
relations.  
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Introduction1 
Within the Chinese industrialization process, no development may be more important than the 
growth of China’s automotive industry, which is a catalyst for many other linked sectors of the 
economy. In particular, China’s focus on the auto industry and the supporting infrastructure and 
development patterns that accompany it may have the potential to upset many existing 
manufacturing and trade relationships in significant ways that are, at present, unclear. Although 
Chinese domestic automotive assembly firms appear unlikely to become significant exporters of 
automobiles to the United States in the short term, the Chinese government appeared, in its March 
2009 three-year plan for the auto industry, “Automotive Industry Readjustment and Revitalization 
Plan,” to be taking a long-run view of the sector’s development.2 
The automobile industry has been a major driver of the U.S. and other industrial economies since 
Henry Ford applied assembly line techniques for manufacturing cars and changed the product 
from a luxury item for wealthy consumers to a nearly essential component of everyday life. The 
automobile industry is already a major force propelling the Chinese economy and its workforce; 
the main question is whether China will mainly consume automobiles in its own market, take a 
more aggressive export-oriented approach similar to that of Japan and Korea, or create some 
mixture of these two. Indicators suggest that China, already far more open to foreign investment 
than either Japan or Korea, may take a hybrid approach that focuses on domestic consumption 
while also building vehicles for export in order to induce Chinese companies to produce world 
class cars. Additionally, China’s automotive parts manufacturing sector is export focused, 
increasingly complex, and rapidly moving from low-cost to more value-added production. 
While the global economic downturn has had a major impact on the U.S. automotive sector, 
China’s rapidly growing auto industry has been a bright spot—especially for foreign firms with a 
presence in China. In 2008, China produced nearly eight times as many motor vehicles as it did in 
the mid-1990s. With annual production of 9.5 million vehicles in 2008, it surpassed the United 
States for the first time, as the second largest national vehicle producer, trailing only Japan in total 
vehicle output. From January to October 2009, about 10.89 million vehicles, reportedly, were sold 
in China.3 If China can sustain this level of growth, it will overtake the United States to become 
the largest auto market in the world. 
Chinese vehicles have become increasingly sophisticated since the 1980s, as a result of 
partnerships with major foreign automakers (Volkswagen, GM, Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Mazda, 
Hyundai and Kia) designed to foster “technological cooperation.” An activist government policy 
has liberalized the Chinese automotive sector in some key respects, but it requires foreign 
manufacturers to undertake joint ventures with local partners in order to obtain market access. 
The stated goal of the Chinese government in the 1980s was to create a market dominated by a 
limited number of internationally competitive joint venture assemblers, supplied by local parts 
manufacturers and, producing to world standards. 
                                               
1
 John Williamson of the CRS Knowledge Services Group assisted in the preparation of the data for this report, 
especially the trade data. 
2
 China News Wrap, “State Council publicly releases steel and automobile stimulus plans,” March 21, 2009. 
http://chinanewswrap.com/2009/03/21/state-council-publicly-releases-steel-and-automobile-stimulus-plans/; China 
View (Xinhua), “China aims for 10 million units in vehicle production, sales in 2009,” March 21, 2009. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/21/content_11048035.htm. 
3
 The Wall Street Journal, “Auto Sales in China Increase Sharply Amid Stimulus Measures” (November 10, 2009). 
The Rise of China’s Auto Industry and Its Impact on the U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry 
 
Congressional Research Service 2 
After two decades of rapid economic growth, the domestic Chinese auto industry has made 
substantial progress. Many independent domestic automotive manufacturers have emerged and 
have ambitions to make cars for developed countries. Although they have to overcome hurdles, 
such as creating their own designs and meeting world standards in terms of product quality, 
safety, and environmental features, the domestic manufacturers are expanding their market share 
and moving up the value chain. Some major Chinese auto makers are shown in Figure 4. 
In November 2008, the Chinese government unveiled a fiscal stimulus package worth Rmb (¥) 4 
trillion (US$586bn), to spur domestic demand and avert an economic slowdown. And in early 
2009, the government announced a sales tax cut on smaller cars and offered incentives to promote 
vehicle sales in rural areas.  
In March 2009, the Chinese government issued the latest automotive industrial policy, which 
encourages the industry to consolidate and restructure. The plan raises eight development goals 
for the auto industry in the next three years (from 2009 through 2011). All of the objectives seem 
to be designed to ensure the steady growth of automobile production and sales in China. The 
policy also supports growth of domestic auto firms, both commercially and technologically. 
Meanwhile, China is pouring resources into alternatively powered vehicles research, aiming to 
leapfrog the U.S. and Europe with new, more efficient and environmentally-friendly vehicles. 
As China becomes a major player in the global auto market, its impact on the domestic U.S. 
industry is also expected to increase. Thus far, the most significant impact may be in automotive 
parts. While U.S.-China trade in motor vehicles is very limited, and likely to remain so for the 
short- to medium-term, bilateral trade in auto parts has grown significantly since 2000, albeit 
from a very low base. 
Congress and the Bush Administration did not take direct measures to address the growth of 
China’s automotive sector or U.S.-China automotive trade. However, as China becomes a top 
automotive manufacturer and a major consumer market, there are concerns about the conditions 
under which U.S. manufacturers must compete with Chinese firms both in China and in the 
global market, including the domestic U.S. market. These concerns have focused on such issues 
as: 
• Chinese currency policy, that continues to maintain a virtually fixed exchange 
rate; 
• Chinese implementation of its commitments as a member of the World Trade 
Organization, especially with respect to protection of non-Chinese firms’ 
intellectual property rights; and 
• The extent to which Chinese firms are subsidized or otherwise supported by the 
government when they compete with foreign companies. 
China as a Major Auto Producer and Consumer 
China Becomes a Top Motor Vehicle Producer 
China’s automotive industry was established in the 1950s, under the guidance of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee and with assistance from the former Soviet Union. 
Although the automotive industry has always been viewed as a strategically crucial sector to 
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move the country into the modern industrial age, it did not substantially develop until the late 
1980s, after Chairman Deng Xiaoping came to power and moved the country toward economic 
development.4 
In 1988, after a visit to China and its fledging automotive industry, then Chrysler Corporation 
CEO Lee Iacocca is said to have reflected that China’s modernization process would be, “A long 
haul. A very long haul.”5 It is now clear that, after building up considerable speed, China’s 
automotive industry has achieved a substantial measure of success. 
Figure 1 illustrates the speed with which China has become one of the world’s top automotive 
manufacturers. China first produced more than 2 million vehicles, of all types, in 2000. Since 
then, it surpassed South Korea (in 2002) and France (not shown on graph, in 2003). With nearly 
5.8 million units of total production in 2005, China approached the production level of Germany, 
Europe’s largest national producer and then-number three in the world, and eventually, overtook 
Germany for third place in 2006. Since then, China’s vehicle production has accelerated, passing 
the 7 million mark in 2006 and approaching 9 million units in 2007. 
In 2008, when the global economy became mired in recession, world vehicle production was 
down 4.1% from the record of over 72 million units built the previous year. The impact of the 
downturn was particularly pronounced for U.S. automakers, with two major U.S. companies, GM 
and Chrysler, fighting to stay afloat by year’s end. China’s automotive industry, however, showed 
considerable strength and continued to grow, albeit at a slower pace. With an output of 9.5 million 
vehicles, for the first time, China overtook the United States in total vehicle production and 
became the second largest motor vehicle producer, trailing only Japan, which produced 11.6 
million vehicles in 2008.6 
During the first 10 months of 2009, China’s auto sales picked up considerable speed, responding 
to the economic stimulus measures from the central government. If this momentum can be 
sustained, China is on pace to displace Japan as the world’s largest motor vehicle producer. Some 
have already projected that China could overtake Japan as the world’s largest automaker as early 
as 2009.7 
                                               
4
 “About FAW, History,” entry at China First Automobile Works (FAW) Group Corporation website, 
http://www.faw.com/webcontent/aboutfaw.jsp?pros=history_forword.jsp&phight=550&about=History, as 
viewed on August 17, 2009. 
5
 Quoted in Jim Mann, Beijing Jeep: A Case Study of Western Business in China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977 
ed.), p. 296. 
6
 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2009, p. 5. 
7
 Washington Post, “As Detroit Crumbles, China Emerges as Auto Epicenter” (May 18, 2009). 
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Figure 1. Leading Motor Vehicle Producers 
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Source: Automotive News. Market Data Book, 2002; Global Market Data Book: 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008. 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, 2009 (for 2008 data).  
Notes: N. America Total includes USA vehicle production; Europe total includes Germany production. 
Moreover, among the leading vehicle producers, China has been the only one showing substantial 
and continuous growth in its production level since 2000. In 2005, North America and western 
Europe each produced more than three times as many vehicles as China. But, between 2005 and 
2008, total U.S. production dropped by over 3.2 million units. Canada also registered a net 
decline of over half a million units. Mexican production, on the other hand, did see a slight 
increase of nearly half a million units from 2005 to 2008. But this was far from enough to offset 
the overall decline in total North American production of nearly 3.4 million units.  
For carmakers in Europe, after an increase in production between 2004 and 2007, overall 
production dropped by nearly 2 million units from the previous year. One notable trend is that, 
starting around 2002, vehicle production in West Europe has been declining, albeit at a moderate 
rate. However, output in eastern and central Europe has been rising steadily—between 2004 and 
2008, total vehicle production in eastern and central Europe has doubled to over 6.5 million units. 
Central and eastern Europe, emerging as a bigger player in the capacity expansion plans of 
western European vehicle manufacturers, have been touted as the “new Detroit” of Europe. Low 
wage levels, less stringent benefits rules, and easily trainable industrial work forces have attracted 
major assembly operations from virtually all manufacturers. However, in terms of continuous 
production growth coupled with surging domestic demand, China is still, clearly, the leading 
force. 
Japan, the largest motor vehicle producer, has shown relatively little overall growth in production, 
in part because of an economic slowdown that has lasted for nearly two decades, the 
strengthening of the yen, and increased production in overseas manufacturing plants. Its total 
output has stagnated at around 10 million vehicles per year between 2000 and 2003. 
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Strengthening exports, including to China and the United States, led to an increase to about 11.6 
million units of production each in 2007 and 2008. 
China’s increase in volume output has also placed it far ahead of other developing countries that 
are considered as actual or potential major automotive producers. In the so-called BRIC countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China), which showcase emerging economies, there has been 
considerable growth in automotive production (see Figure 2).  
Figure 2. BRIC Countries Motor Vehicle Production 
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Source: Automotive News, Market Data Book, 2002, and Global Market Data Book: 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008; 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, 2009 (for 2008 data). 
• Brazil’s production was stable from 2000 through 2003, and then increased by 
400,000 units to 2.2 million in 2004, and further to 3.2 million in 2008.  
• Production in Russia remained flat from 2000 through 2004 and then grew, albeit 
at a relatively slow rate, to 1.8 million units in 2008. 
• India, viewed by some sources as being comparable to China in terms of its 
potential as both an automotive market and a location of production, saw its 
annual vehicle production volume increase from 900,000 units in 2000-02 to 2.3 
million in 2008.  
Nevertheless, the combined net growth of auto production in these other three BRIC countries 
between 2000 and 2008 was only slightly over a quarter of the total volume growth in China. 
Equally significant is the product composition of Chinese motor vehicle output, which appears to 
be evolving primarily toward meeting growing domestic consumer demand for personal vehicles, 
notably passenger cars. This is closer to the model of production seen in a mature industrial 
market than in a developing economy. It is also an indication that, as per capita national income 
grows rapidly, especially in the coastal regions and big inland cities, personal vehicles are no 
longer luxury items exclusively for the privileged few. 
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In the mid-1990s, out of a total output of 1.2 million vehicles, China produced 300,000 passenger 
cars, with trucks and buses accounting for the remaining output. The United States in the 1990s 
also produced more trucks than passenger cars. But in the U.S. case, trucks overwhelmingly 
consisted of minivans, SUVs, and pickup trucks, which were generally considered being more for 
personal use. In China, however, the “truck” category in the 1990s was much more oriented 
toward heavy duty and mass transit equipment, while the “bus” category appears to include at 
least some types of minivans. As late as 2004, combined truck and bus production in China was 
still slightly higher than output of passenger cars.8 
Although there are differences in vehicle categorization, a key indicator for China’s auto industry 
is the rise of the share of production devoted to passenger cars, which is usually generated by 
rising demand among middle-class consumers. Figure 3 shows that production of passenger cars 
started to rise consistently after 2000. 
Figure 3. Chinese Motor Vehicle Production 
 Annual Vehicle Production, 2000-2008 
0
2
4
6
8
10
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Millions of Units
All Motor Vehicles Passenger Cars Commercial Vehicles
All Motor Vehicles
Passenger Cars
Commercial Vehicles
 
Source: Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, 2001-2009. 
Notes: Commercial Vehicles include trucks and buses, a category that includes light trucks, SUVs, and minivans.  
Prior to 2000, China’s leading automakers were joint-venture partners with foreign automobile 
companies, with product mix and output subject to bureaucratic intervention and negotiations—a 
process well-documented in the book Beijing Jeep.9 But this began to change at the turn of the 
century, as noted in Ward’s 2001 Automotive Yearbook: 
                                               
8
 Chinese data for the “truck” category combines “light” trucks and heavy trucks, while the “bus” category appears to 
include at least some types of minivans, which, in the United States, are considered “light” trucks. Production and sales 
data for the United States typically combine cars and light trucks to yield total vehicle sales. During most of this 
decade, light truck production and sales in the U.S. were greater than that for passenger cars. Because Chinese data do 
not distinguish between heavy truck and light trucks, the key variable would appear to be the share of production 
devoted to passenger cars. 
9
 Mann, Beijing Jeep. 
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In years past, the Chinese government would decide what product would best suit a 
proposed automotive joint venture, usually a 50/50 partnership between a global 
automaker and a state-run Chinese firm. Although the products often were ill-suited to 
market conditions, multinational automakers agreed to build them in order to get a 
foothold in the potentially high-volume Chinese market. ... In 2000, China granted the 
wishes of many global automakers, allowing them to build small, affordable vehicles—
known as “people’s cars”—for the domestic market. 
The liberalization of product regulations undoubtedly positioned China for long-term 
growth in the private car ownership market. The country’s pending entry into the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) was expected to open the market even further for private 
consumers and ensure a big pay-off for companies waiting to tap China’s boundless 
potential.10 
China’s passenger car output increased slowly from a quarter of total motor vehicle production in 
1994 (not shown in Figure 3) to about 30% in 2000-01. After that, passenger car output drove 
rapid motor vehicle production growth. As overall output increased from an annual range of 
600,000 to 700,000 vehicles to over 5 million annually by 2004, nearly 50% of total production 
was passenger cars by that year (see Figure 3).  
More passenger cars were produced in China in 2005 than commercial vehicles, roughly at a 
55/45 split. This composition held through 2007. In 2008, production of passenger cars surged to 
more than 65% of the total vehicle output that year, even as automobile sales growth slumped to 
6.7% from an average annual rate of 25% over the previous seven years. Vehicle production and 
purchases in 2008 were affected by falling stock markets and real estate values, shrinking GDP, 
rising commodity and fuel prices, and a serious decline in exports.11 
During the first 10 months in 2009, auto sales in China continued to accelerate and reportedly, 
reached 10.89 million units, making China the world’s largest auto market for this time period. 
The month of October, alone, registered vehicle sales of 1.23 million units, a 72.5% year-on-year 
increase. Such rapid growth was partly, if not completely, helped by government stimulus 
measures that include rural subsidies and a purchase tax cut on small vehicles, which are 
scheduled to expire at the end of 2009. However, if these incentives are extended, the China 
Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM) projected that China’s auto market could 
expand by another 10% in 2010.12 
China’s motor vehicle market has indeed grown at an unprecedented rate in recent years, with 
new vehicle sales and production in lockstep growth. The first wave of car buyers appeared in 
China’s large cities along the prosperous eastern seaboard, where vehicle ownership surged 
around 2000. Five years later, the car market took off in the smaller coastal urban areas and major 
inland cities. In 2008, China became the second largest motor vehicle market with total sales of 
9.38 million units (excluding imports), just behind the United States.13 
                                               
10
 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2001, p. 72. China joined the WTO in 2001, upon which automotive import tariffs 
were cut. 
11
 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2009, “China Sales Growth Slows on Global Slump,” p. 36. 
12
 Financial Times, “BMW plans to boost China output after demand surge” (November 13, 2009). 
13
 Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2009, p. 249. The U.S. total vehicle sales was 10.1 million units, excluding 3.4 million 
imports.  
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With the onset of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008, growth in China’s vehicle 
sales slowed, reflecting the weakened state of the domestic economy and low consumer 
confidence. In response to weakening demand, the Chinese government introduced several policy 
measures, including the aforementioned economic stimulus, to boost car sales.14 In January 2009, 
the government halved sales taxes for smaller cars with engine capacities of no more than 1.6 
liters. Further, ¥5 billion (U.S. $732 million) has been allocated to subsidize farmers who want to 
upgrade three-wheel tractors and small trucks.  
China’s auto market continued to grow in the first half of 2009. According to the China 
Association of Automobile Manufacturers (CAAM), as many as 6.1 million vehicles were sold in 
the first half of 2009, in part helped by the incentives. This strong growth is in stark contrast to 
the sluggish market in other parts of the world, and moreover, China’s surging car market still has 
considerable growth potential.  
A number of factors are set to drive market demand in the next few years.  
First, market potential arises from China’s relatively low rate of car ownership, which stood at 
about 22 cars per 1,000 people in 2008. This ratio is low compared with a global average of 120 
per 1,000 and over 600 per 1,000 in the United States.15 China’s rapid economic growth and 
rising personal income, particularly in big cities, have been fueling the demand for personal 
motor vehicles. Second, since 2002, both foreign and domestic carmakers have expanded 
production capacity in the country in anticipation of continued strong demand growth. This 
generated significant competition and falling vehicle prices. In 2007, average car prices across 
China dropped by nearly 6% from 2006, while the per capita income of urban residents increased 
by 12.2%, to $1,942.16 With more products available at competitive prices, car ownership is 
spreading rapidly among the expanding middle-class. Another factor resulting in greater demand 
for cars is the improvement and expansion of China’s road network. China has been investing 
heavily in improving its highway network. According to an industry report by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit, by the end of 2008 China had just over 60,000 kilometers (km, approximately 
37,282 miles) of high-speed roads, double the length of the network in 2002, making it one of the 
largest motorway systems in the world, just behind the interstate system of 75,000 km (46,603 
miles) in the United States. Most of China’s road network, however, was built within the past 15 
years.17 
Foreign and Domestic Producers in the 
Chinese Motor Vehicle Industry 
American automotive manufacturers were among the earliest international companies to move 
into China with the opening of the market to foreign investors in the 1980s. In 1983, after tedious 
and difficult negotiations, American Motors Corporation (AMC) signed a joint-venture (JV) 
agreement with China’s Beijing Automotive Works, the first such major manufacturing deal 
reached by a western industrial company in China. Despite this early initiative, American 
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companies largely lost out in the early period of growth in the Chinese automotive market, first to 
Japanese imports, and then to European investors, particularly Volkswagen (VW).18 
Despite AMC’s early entry, and Chrysler’s subsequent purchase of AMC and its successful 
management of the Beijing Jeep factory, General Motors (GM) is the U.S. automotive 
manufacturer that has made the biggest investment and achieved the most success in the Chinese 
auto market. In 1997 GM established a 50-50 joint venture with the Shanghai Automotive 
Industry Corporation Group (SAIC) to manufacture passenger vehicles. GM also participates as a 
minority shareholder (34%) in a joint venture with both SAIC (50.1%) and Wuling Automotive 
Company (15.9%) to produce minivans, “mini-trucks,” and the Chevrolet Spark mini-car, the 
latter a product based on designs from GM’s Korean subsidiary, GM Daewoo Auto and 
Technology (GM Daewoo). To supply the emerging market in China’s inland region, SAIC-GM-
Wuling also intend to assemble a new economy vehicle, reportedly to debut in 2011, which will 
be “built on a platform no longer needed by Buick.”19  
In 2009, GM had nine joint ventures in China, a wholly owned parts distribution center, and a 
wholly owned investment subsidiary in Shanghai that houses GM’s local staff and invests in 
GM’s vehicle joint ventures in China. GM employs more than 32,000 employees in China.20 In 
July 2009, GM announced that it was relocating its international operations from Detroit to 
Shanghai. GM International Operations (GMIO) replaces the regional operating structure that 
characterized GM’s operations before bankruptcy. The new organization is to have functional and 
geographic control of all GM international operations worldwide, with the exception of GM 
North America.21  
GM and its various joint-venture partners manufacture Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Saab, Opel, 
and Wuling vehicles. Buick and Chevrolet are GM’s volume brands in China. Many of these 
vehicles are based on designs by Daewoo or GM’s European subsidiary, Opel. Vehicles are re-
engineered for China at the Pan Asia Technical Automotive Center (PATAC), a GM joint venture 
with SAIC.22  
In contrast to its experience in the challenging environment in North America, GM expanded 
rapidly in China and became the top carmaker in the world’s most populous country. The 
automaker, which sold its first car in China in the 1920s, expects to double annual Chinese 
vehicle sales to more than 2 million over the next five years.23 According to General Motors, it 
sold 1.46 million vehicles during the first 10 months of 2009, an increase of 60% over the first 10 
months of 2008.24 
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In 2007, GM overtook VW as the leading foreign-owned motor vehicle manufacturer in China, in 
terms of market share of vehicle sales. The automotive market in China is largely dominated by 
international companies (see Table 1 and Figure 4). Such dominance is particularly strong in the 
fastest-growing passenger cars category, where about two-thirds of new cars sold were produced 
by international companies. General Motors and Volkswagen are by far the leading vendors, each 
commanding more than 10% of the market. A number of other major car makers follow, including 
Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Mazda of Japan, and Hyundai-Kia of South Korea.  
Chery Automobile Co. Ltd. was the leading independent domestic vehicle manufacturer in sales, 
Some other major domestic automakers are China First Automobile Works Group Corporation 
(FAW), Geely, SAIC, and Dongfeng. 
Table 1. Motor Vehicle Sales in China and Market Share of Selected Manufacturers, 
2007-2008 
  2007   2008  
  000s % 000s % 
GM  1,032 11.7% 1,074 11.3% 
VW 918 10.4% 964 10.1% 
      
TOYOTA 460 5.2% 538 5.6% 
HONDA 422 4.8% 470 4.9% 
HYUNDAI - KIA 355 4.0% 437 4.6% 
      
CHERY 387 4.4% 356 3.7% 
NISSAN 272 3.1% 346 3.6% 
FAW 294 3.3% 302 3.2% 
      
GEELY 220 2.5% 237 2.5% 
MAZDA 222 2.5% 209 2.2% 
      
TOTAL 8,819 100% 9,541 100% 
Source: Ward’s Auto InfoBank. 
Notes: Totals in Table 1 include sales of other manufacturers not listed, and are used to calculate market share 
of the listed auto makers. 
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To virtually all of the major global automakers, China appears to be the only sizable market with 
strong and persistent growth. Given such prospects, almost all the major international automakers 
either are expanding operations in the country or are in the process of establishing plants. For 
example Shanghai GM opened a second plant in December 2008 at (Shenyang) Norsom Motors 
Co., another GM joint venture. The new factory initially will produce Chevrolet’s new compact 
sedan, the Cruze.25 In August 2009, GM formed a new 50-50 joint venture with FAW Group to 
make light trucks in China for the first time. Fiat, the Italian auto group, recently announced a 50-
50 joint venture with Guangzhou Automobile Group to make cars and engines for the Chinese 
market.26 Fiat has been looking for a new local partner since it terminated a venture with Nanjing 
Auto in late 2007.27 
Figure 4. Largest Multinational Motor Vehicle Manufacturers in China,  
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Source: Ward’s Auto InfoBank. 
Among the Detroit Three producers, Ford has been slowest to establish a manufacturing presence 
in China. After a strong sales increase from 2005 to 2006, Ford sales have been flat in this rapidly 
growing market and, therefore, it has ceded market share to competitors. Ford’s total annual sales 
in 2008 of affiliated brands was about 162,000 units, slightly lower than 2007 sales.28 Meanwhile, 
Chrysler’s future plan for China operations remains unclear. After the automaker stopped 
producing Jeep models in China in 2007, it reportedly decided to supply imported vehicles, 
mainly Jeep, through a small dealer network. In late 2008, Chrysler pulled out of Daimler’s joint 
venture with Beijing Automotive. A Chrysler deal to produce cars with China’s domestic 
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producer, Chery Automotive, failed to materialize in December 2008—at the same time that the 
U.S. government began moving to shore up Chrysler’s waning finances. Another planned 
partnership to share technology, components, and distribution channels with Great Wall Motor 
has been on hold.29 
Figure 5. Largest Chinese Motor Vehicle Manufacturers, 
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Source: Ward’s Auto InfoBank. 
Independent Production vs. Foreign Cooperation 
When the central government decided to open China’s auto market to international companies, it 
was fully aware that domestic manufacturers then would not be able to compete with the more 
sophisticated and experienced foreign rivals. To surmount this problem, foreign automakers were 
allowed to enter the Chinese market only through joint ventures with local partners, each no more 
than 50% controlled by a major foreign nameplate automotive manufacturer. 
For example, Volkswagen has joined forces with Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (SAIC) 
and First Automotive Works Corp. (FAW). SAIC is also a joint venture partner of GM, while 
FAW is also a partner of Toyota. Honda and PSA Peugeot Citroen have both formed partnerships 
with Dongfeng Motor Corp. There are numerous other automotive manufacturing alliances 
between domestic and foreign automakers. 
Foreign investments entered China in three waves. Between the mid 1980s and late 1990s, 
China’s market was dominated by three foreign joint ventures—VW’s joint venture with SAIC, 
and with FAW, in addition to PSA Peugeot Citroen’s joint venture with Dongfeng.30 From the late 
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1990s to 2001, GM and Honda entered the market, and then, after China’s accession to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001, other foreign automakers also entered the 
market.31 
The Chinese government hoped, initially, that such arrangements would allow Chinese car 
producers to tap the technological and management expertise of their foreign partners. In 
exchange, foreign automakers would gain access to the vast Chinese market. Two-and-a-half 
decades later, however, foreign corporations are perceived by the domestic auto makers to have 
benefited more than their local partners from these link-ups. According to Automotive News 
China, “while some [domestic] own-brand cars are built on platforms transferred from global 
automakers, almost all of the rest are products of the reverse engineering of international models. 
Some domestic firms continue to resort to outright copying.”32 
From the foreign joint venture partners’ perspective, China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) 
regime provides insufficient protection for foreign partners’ IPRs, as will be discussed in the 
section on trade below. Foreign companies in China have taken steps to protect proprietary 
technology, as well as product design and development, the crucial stage in automotive 
manufacturing. From the Chinese perspective, however, operating through joint ventures has been 
least satisfactory in terms of the perceived benefits for local research and development activities. 
Moreover, some assert, cooperation through joint ventures inherently restrains the Chinese 
partner from independently developing an export market for vehicles. In this view, support and 
planning for global vehicle sales must be coordinated within the sales and service network of the 
international partner. 
SAIC and Nanjing Automobile Group Buys Bankrupt Rover Group; SAIC 
Later Buys Nanjing 
One strategy the Chinese government has been exploring is whether to allow domestic 
automakers to acquire foreign brands. The first attempt of this kind was the purchase of MG 
Rover by SAIC and Nanjing Automobile Group in 2005. Seeking to obtain advanced automotive 
technology and manufacturing capacity, these two Chinese automakers set out to acquired MG 
Rover, a company with a complicated and sometimes unsuccessful history.  
The predecessor of MG Rover was the Rover Group, itself a remnant of the nationalized British 
Leyland Motor Corporation (later known as BL Ltd.). BL manufactured such brands as Jaguar, 
Rover, Land Rover, and Mini. In 1984, Jaguar was privatized and later sold to Ford in 1989 and 
then to Tata Motors of India in 2008. In 1986, BL was renamed Rover Group and, in 1988, was 
privatized and sold to British Aerospace. BL’s commercial truck and bus business was spun off in 
1986. The remainder of Rover Group was purchased by BMW in 1994. That purchase reflected 
BMW’s effort to become a volume car producer. By 2000, Rover Group was inflicting a serious 
financial drain on BMW, which sold the MG and Rover brands to a group of British investors, the 
Phoenix Consortium, for £10. At the same time, BMW also sold the Land Rover brand to Ford,33 
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while retaining Rolls-Royce,34 the Mini brand, and production facilities at Cowley and Swindon, 
England. BMW also kept the Triumph and Riley trademarks. 
The Phoenix Consortium, which formed MG Rover, also acquired the Longbridge assembly plant 
in Birmingham, England. MG Rover went into receivership in 2005. In July 2005, Nanjing 
Automobile Group purchased the remaining assets of MG Rover for about $100 million and 
invested another $50 million to prepare the plant for production. Also in 2005, before MG Rover 
collapsed, SAIC acquired the intellectual property rights to two Rover automobile platforms and 
planned to produce vehicles in China for domestic and export sales. SAIC developed Roewe 
brand cars on Rover platforms.35  
In December 2007, SAIC, China’s largest automaker, acquired Nanjing Automobile.36 Chinese 
government officials, reportedly, have said they want to see an industry centered on three or four 
auto groups that have the resources and technology to succeed globally. The tie-up between SAIC 
and Nanjing Auto could serve as a model as regulators push smaller auto makers to merge with 
larger manufacturers.37 In September 2008, the Longbridge plant, which employed about 380 
workers, began assembling MG roadster kits imported from China.38 
Chinese Auto Assemblers and Parts Makers 
The Chinese automotive market remains highly fragmented. There are about a hundred vehicle 
manufacturers, with only a few capable of achieving viable sales volumes.39 Many are subsidized 
by provincial governments eager for the prestige, employment, and tax revenue provided by the 
automakers. About two-thirds of the top 25 domestic producers are owned by the state.40 The 
central government, reportedly, is encouraging industry consolidation, but has had little success 
so far. Part of the reason, at least, is the vested interest of local governments.41 
On the automotive suppliers’ side, a diversity of other strategies has been adopted by Chinese 
parts producers, including direct relationships with foreign automotive suppliers. With no 
government restrictions on joint venture ownership rules, such as those that affect nameplate 
vehicle assembly operations, more and more international parts manufacturers have followed 
their Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) partners to China and established operations 
there. For example, Magna International Inc., Canada’s largest auto parts maker, currently has 17 
manufacturing and 6 sales, engineering, and product development facilities in China; Visteon has 
25 manufacturing facilities and 3 customer service centers in China.42 
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Another option for Chinese OEMs and OEM suppliers is outright purchase of foreign automotive 
suppliers. This strategy has the advantage of allowing Chinese firms to target technologies and 
intellectual property that they need to improve automotive quality. In June 2009, Geely 
Automotive, a top domestic manufacturer of passenger vehicles, completed the acquisition of an 
Australian auto parts company, Drivetran Systems International (DSI), which will allow Geely to 
improve its development of gearboxes.43 
With western automakers suffering financial distress with declines in production and sales, 
speculation that Chinese companies might seek to acquire some of the assets of troubled western 
car makers has come to pass. China’s largest privately owned automaker, Geely, reportedly 
approached Magna, the Canadian parts producer, about taking an investment position in GM’s 
Opel subsidiary. According to the CEO of Geely, its parent company, Geely Group Holding Co. 
“seeks to buy all of Volvo,” a company owned by Ford. In late October 2009, Ford announced 
that Geely is its preferred bidder in negotiations to sell Volvo. Lewis Booth, executive vice 
president and chief financial officer of Ford, said, “Ford believes Geely has the potential to be a 
responsible future owner of Volvo and to take the business forward while preserving its core 
values and the independence of the Swedish brand. But there is much work that needs to be 
completed in the more substantive discussions that are agreed to take place. We have no specific 
timeline to conclude the discussions.”44 
In July 2009, Beijing Auto bid for a part of Opel, but was turned down by GM after intellectual 
property issues became a hurdle.45 Another issue was that Beijing Auto’s parent company, Beijing 
Automotive Industry Holdings Co. Ltd. (BAIC), planned to move Opel production to China.46 In 
August 2009, GM sold 100% of Saab to Koenigsegg Group AB, a Swedish manufacturer of high 
end, sports cars. On September 9, 2009, BAIC and Koenigsegg announced a tentative agreement 
that would allow BAIC to become a non-controlling minority shareholder in Koenigsegg.47 The 
only Chinese company, so far, to agree to purchase a GM subsidiary is a little-known, privately 
owned heavy equipment manufacturer, Sichuan Tengzhong Heavy Industrial Machinery, which 
has agreed, subject to Chinese government approval, to buy the Hummer sports utility vehicle 
marque from GM for $250 million.48 
Automotive Readjustment and Revitalization Plan 
Given the rapid and steady growth of China’s auto industry and the apparent ambitions of several 
domestic automakers, some are surprised that the Chinese government has not been more 
aggressive in promoting the creation of domestic brands by Chinese firms, especially those that 
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are partners in foreign joint ventures. Ward’s Automotive Yearbook 2008 stated, “Although 
China’s 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) for the auto industry included an article requiring such 
development of indigenous brands, it was not officially promulgated in early 2007 as originally 
scheduled.”49 
In March 2009, the State Council, China’s Cabinet, released the Automotive Readjustment and 
Revitalization Plan (the Plan), the latest development blueprint for the auto industry in China.50 
The three-year plan contains eight development goals for the auto industry from 2009 through 
2011. All of the goals appear to be designed to ensure that automobile production and sales in 
China continue at a steady pace. The overall objective is to achieve a 10% average growth in the 
next three years, using 2009 as base year, during which more than 10 million units of automobiles 
have been projected to be produced and sold. 
The plan also provides guidance on the composition of automobile production for the Chinese 
market: small passenger cars with engine displacement of under 1.5 liters are to account for more 
than 40% of market share, while cars under 1.1 liters, will comprise over 15% of the market. To 
this end, China has halved the purchase taxes for small cars and started to encourage auto 
consumption in rural areas with government subsidies. 
In the plan, the government also reiterated its support and determination to encourage auto 
industry mergers and restructuring. According to the plan, a goal is the consolidation of the 
current 14 major auto manufacturing groups, which account for more than 90% of China’s 
production and market share, into 10 auto makers by 2011. The plan also envisions eventually 
having two to three giant auto groups with an annual output capacity of over 2 million units, and 
four to five big groups with annual production capacity of over 1 million units. 
The plan also calls for independent domestic vehicle manufacturers to increase their share of the 
domestic market to over 40%, with about 10% of vehicle exports made by independent Chinese 
assemblers. It also encourages auto parts manufacturers to expand capacity through mergers and 
restructuring, while seeking independence in the technological development of key auto parts and 
components. 
The plan also calls for the overall improvement in automotive technologies, including greater fuel 
efficiency and development of new energy sources, as well as safety features. These measures are 
intended to improve the Chinese motor vehicle industry’s competitiveness and appear to be in line 
with the government’s ongoing efforts to curb growing energy dependence on imported oil and to 
reduce air pollution, which, in China’s biggest cities, is largely caused by cars. Gasoline 
consumption by motor vehicles accounts for about one-third of China’s total oil demand. The 
government has introduced a number of measures to reduce fuel consumption, including raising 
fuel prices and reducing taxes on smaller vehicles.51 In early 2008, the Chinese government 
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started a pilot program, offering incentives to taxi and other fleet operators if they purchase 
alternative-energy vehicles.52 
Support and fiscal incentives from the central government, local provinces, and municipalities 
have spurred a surge in projects to produce alternative-energy vehicles and technologies. Nissan 
Renault has announced a partnership with the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology to 
promote electric cars and to create a battery-charging network. In April 2009, SAIC announced 
that it would produce gas-engine hybrid cars using battery technology and parts from two U.S.-
based manufacturers, A123 Systems and Delphi.53 
The Shenzhen city government, like several other provincial and municipal counterparts, has 
announced support for advanced technology initiatives. Shenzhen will provide fiscal support for 
BYD Auto Company, the car manufacturing subsidiary of one of the world’s largest battery 
manufacturers. American investor Warren Buffet’s investment firm, Berkshire Hathaway, bought 
a 10% stake in BYD in 2008. The company manufactures electric, dual mode (pure electric and 
hybrid), and standard gasoline-powered vehicles and has announced plans to enter the U.S. auto 
market in 2010, a year ahead of schedule.54 
Alternative energy vehicles have strong support from governments at all levels in China. Both 
China and India would like to exploit and rapidly adopt new technologies in the hope of leap-
frogging mature countries that are unlikely to experience the same dramatic growth levels in the 
future. However, local (i.e., provincial or municipal) governments that use subsidies to favor 
“local champions” run a very real risk of research duplication and market fragmentation.55 Such 
an outcome would be quite inefficient. 
Impact of China on the U.S. Automotive Market 
Chinese-Made Vehicle Imports Not Imminent 
The number of vehicles produced in China annually more or less equals the number of vehicles 
sold there, with both exports and imports at relatively low levels. In 2005, China became a net 
exporter of vehicles for the first time, with 172,800 export units. Since then, the country’s motor 
vehicle exports have been growing. According to China Association of Automobile 
Manufacturers (CAAM), China exported a total of 617,900 units in 2008, of which 56% were 
passenger vehicles, while 44% were commercial vehicles.56 
The vast majority of China’s vehicle exports are by domestic companies such as Chery and Geely. 
Vehicles made by independent domestic automakers, as opposed to those built by Chinese joint 
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venture partners, account for more than 70% of the total exports, while the remainder were 
exported by non-Chinese manufacturers.57 Most Chinese car exports are destined for developing 
countries in Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, where their unit prices are reported to be 
less than US$10,000.58 Vehicle exports to Russia rose quickly in 2007 and 2008, and accounted 
for 13% (or 48,000 units) of Chinese auto exports during the first half of 2008. Some EU member 
states, such as Romania, Poland, and the Czech Republic, have also seen an increase of motor 
vehicles imported from China.59 
In 2005, American entrepreneur Malcolm Bricklin undertook widely publicized efforts to form a 
200-dealer network (named Visionary Vehicles) aimed at selling 250,000 Chery-made vehicles in 
the U.S. market by 2007. After delaying the start of sales several times, Bricklin reportedly 
postponed his plan until late 2008 in order to meet the U.S. government crash-test safety 
requirements.60 In July 2008, Bricklin filed a lawsuit against Chery Automobile Co., along with 
some of its affiliates and officials, under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 
severing ties with Chery.61 No Chery vehicles were sold in the U.S. 
Attempts to export more vehicles to developed-country markets (such as the US and the EU) have 
been repeatedly delayed due to poor product quality and the failure of Chinese domestic brands to 
meet safety and emissions requirements. A domestic automaker, Jiangling Motors Co. Ltd., 
debuted its Landwind SUV in Europe in 2006 and was widely criticized by the European media 
for its lack of safety features and poor handling. The German automobile club, Allgemeiner 
Deutscher Automobil-Club e.V. (ADAC), which also conducts crash testing, reportedly insisted it 
be banned from European roads.62 In 2007, another Chinese domestic vehicle manufacturer, 
Brilliance Auto, was forced to put its European export plans aside after one Brilliance car scored 
the worst crash test results in the history of ADAC. Furthermore, a recording of a Brilliance car 
failing a crash test was later broadcast on YouTube, an Internet video-sharing site, damaging the 
brand.63  
Some major auto producers have been exporting motor vehicles from China. One of the leading 
foreign manufacturers using China as an export platform is Honda. One of its operations is a joint 
venture in Guangzhou producing sedans solely for export. Chinese regulations, in general, 
prohibit multinationals from owning more than 50 percent of auto assembly joint ventures in 
China. But the government made an exception in 2003 and allowed Honda to own 65% of the 
assembly plant in Guangzhou, because the output is solely for export. In 2005, this operation 
accounted for 25% of China’s passenger car exports, including 9,700 Honda Jazz subcompacts to 
Europe.64 GM announced in August 2009 that its SAIC-GM-Wuling joint venture would begin 
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exporting two of its most popular mini-commercial vehicles under the Chevrolet brand to South 
America, North Africa, and the Middle East. Exports to Peru reported began in July 2009.65  
In May 2009, various news sources reported that GM was planning to build a new small car in 
China for export to the United States.66 It was also reported that GM planned to sell about 17,300 
Chinese-made vehicles in the United States in 2011 and then to triple the volume to 51,500 in 
2014. However, such plans drew immediate opposition from some Members of Congress and the 
United Auto Workers (UAW).67 In negotiations with the UAW in May 2009, GM announced that 
it would invest in a new compact and small car assembly plant in the United States capable of 
producing 160,000 annual units of production. This was widely regarded as a concession to the 
UAW.68 A GM plant in Orion, MI was selected as the site to build the new small car. 
China, thus far, has played little part in terms of exporting motor vehicles to the United States. 
Most of the vehicles imported into the United States from China, so far, have been largely limited 
to multi-use small trucks and vans for off-road use. The United States had a trade surplus with 
China in motor vehicles in 2008: $1,102 million in U.S. exports versus $149 million in imports69 
(see Table 2).  
The Chinese Auto Parts Sector  
There are multiple reasons for foreign parts makers to build facilities in China. 
First of all, unlike the 50% cap on foreign ownership in vehicle manufacturing companies, there 
are no limits on foreign stakes in the automotive parts sector. This means international companies 
can set up wholly foreign-owned auto parts companies in China, without fear of transferring 
advanced technology to local partners. Second, the Chinese government increased the tariffs on 
auto parts from 10% to 25% if imported parts made up more than 60% of the finished vehicle’s 
value. This controversial tariff, which resulted in a WTO dispute case, will be discussed later in 
this report. Other important factors are competitive labor costs and an increasingly skilled labor 
force.70 However, as China’s economy continues to grow and the living standards continue to rise, 
wages and benefits will increase as well. There also has been pressure for China to allow its 
currency to appreciate further. On the other hand, the U.S. auto industry is going through 
restructuring and its labor costs should become more competitive. China’s advantage as a low-
cost manufacturing base will likely diminish over time. 
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Table 2. U.S.-China Automotive Trade 
$ millions 
NAIC 
No.   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
33637 Metal Stampings (US exps) 0 1 1 1 2 8 12 9 5 
  (US imps.) 1 1 1 2 2 4 4 5 5 
             
33633 Steering & Suspension Components, 
excl. Spring (US exps.) 
3 3 3 1 4 5 13 17 10 
  (US imps.) 6 7 11 18 20 33 67 77 120 
             
33634 Brake Systems (US exps.) 12 4 9 9 6 18 37 31 31 
  (US imps.) 154 169 202 269 354 433 556 761 884 
             
33636 Seating & Interior Trim (US exps.) 31 24 37 33 29 37 24 35 32 
  (US imps.) 66 72 102 181 231 280 340 386 468 
             
33635 Transmission & Power Train Parts (US 
exps.) 
9 18 18 29 63 37 38 18 36 
  (US imps.) 39 53 65 75 119 214 289 317 313 
             
33631 Gasoline Engine & Engine Parts (US 
exps.) 
9 15 16 31 38 34 34 82 59 
  (US imps.) 42 58 96 96 115 168 220 263 304 
             
33632 Electrical & Electronic Equipment (US 
exps.) 
32 33 59 47 55 79 59 66 77 
  (US imps.) 244 213 269 305 421 531 647 794 858 
             
33639 Misc. Auto Parts (US exps.) 97 129 159 289 328 299 451 634 433 
  (US imps.) 282 385 542 726 1,118 1,569 2,198 2,685 2,591 
             
3363 Motor Vehicle Parts - Total (US exps.) 193 226 302 441 525 517 669 893 684 
  (US imps.) 834 958 1,288 1,671 2,380 3,231 4,319 5,287 5,543 
             
3361 Motor Vehicles - Total, incl. chassis 
(US exps.) 
38 30 64 140 125 300 601 841 1,102 
  (US imps.) 2 3 6 19 61 126 174 223 149 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. Trade Dataweb, based on North American Industry Classification 
(NAIC) system definitions, 4-digit and 5-digit levels. 
Notes: Domestic exports, U.S. imports for consumption. Totals include categories not shown. 
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Vehicle and parts manufacturers also need to contain shipping costs, which reflect fluctuations in 
the price of oil. According to the Economist, the cost of shipping a standard 40-foot container 
between Shanghai and America’s East Coast, for example, jumped from $3,000 in 2000 to about 
$8,000 in 2008.71 While the cost of container shipments subsequently declined with the onset of 
the global recession, the advantage of extensive supply chains may only apply when shipping 
costs are inexpensive. For all but the most labor-intensive parts, the attraction of low labor costs 
may not be sufficient to offset the high costs of maintaining a trans-Pacific supply chain. The 
close proximity between car makers and their suppliers is crucial to better JIT (Just-in-Time) 
inventory and production management. 
The quality of locally sourced Chinese auto parts was not up to expectations in the early years of 
the Chinese auto sector. Frank Ogden, vice president of global supplier development for the PAC 
group, a Shanghai based consulting company, was quoted in Who Really Made Your Car?, a book 
on the auto parts industry by Thomas Klier and James Rubenstein, “Only 15 percent of Chinese 
suppliers can meet those standards ... Problems range from not knowing how to meet a 
customer’s deadlines to inadequate testing of raw materials.” Nevertheless, parts quality has 
improved considerably, as noted by Klier and Rubenstein: 
... China has seen rapidly improving quality. GM’s defect rate for parts in China declined 
from 2,197 per million in 1999 and 1,397 per million in 2000 to only 23 per million in 
2003. In comparison, GM’s worldwide defect rate in 2003 was much higher (35 per 
million) and only slightly lower (22 per million) in the United States.72 
Shanghai and the surrounding provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui are the leading centers 
for the manufacture of auto parts, accounting for about 40% of total production. Other import 
parts-manufacturing hubs include Guangzhou, Chongqing and Changchun.73  
China’s domestic automotive-parts manufacturers typically have limited R&D capacity and, as a 
result, are usually restricted to the production of lower-end products, such as tires, wheel hubs 
and other labor-intensive products. However, there are signs that the domestic parts 
manufacturers are trying to move up the value chain. As previously mentioned, in June 2009, 
Geely announced the acquisition of an Australian company, Drivetran Systems, which may allow 
Geely to improve its development of gearboxes and move up the technological ladder.74 The same 
can be said for BYD Auto Company and other independent producers: as they develop new 
automotive technologies (such as batteries and electric systems for cars) over time, they could 
emerge as significant competitors to American companies. 
In conclusion, the current U.S. automotive market is still under the shadow of the economic 
downturn, and the U.S. domestic auto industry continues to restructure. The slump in vehicle 
sales since late 2008, albeit temporarily relieved by the “cash-for-clunkers” incentives of July and 
August 2009, has resulted in substantial idle capacity in the United States. In China, however, 
carmakers and auto parts manufacturers have seen continued growth in domestic auto sales. But 
global acceptance of the quality and safety of Chinese automobiles remains a challenge for the 
present. Before it overcomes these issues, the Chinese auto industry is likely to go through a 
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period of consolidation and restructuring—if for no other reason than the current (2009-2011) 
three-year plan calls for it. 
U.S. Policy Issues in Economic Relations with China 
With a 5.1% increase in total U.S. imports ($337.8 billion) from China and a bilateral U.S. trade 
deficit that rose to more than $268 billion in 2008, representatives of the Obama administration, 
as well as many Members of Congress, would like to achieve more balance in U.S.-China trade 
relations. Several factors that contribute to the trade deficit are Chinese exchange rate policies 
that tie the value of the renminbi (RMB) to the U.S. dollar, alleged government subsidies to 
industrial producers, and high levels of exports of various products into the U.S. market. From the 
perspective of the Administration, the main effort, so far, besides discussions on exchange rate 
issues, has been on ensuring that China fully adheres to its World Trade Organization (WTO) 
commitments, including in the auto sector.75  
Complicating the U.S.-China economic relationship is China’s large holdings of U.S. debt, such 
as U.S. Treasury securities. Some welcome China’s purchases of U.S. debt securities, which help 
to fund U.S. federal budget deficit, while many policymakers have raised concerns that growing 
Chinese holdings of U.S. debt may increase China’s leverage over the United States on major 
political and economic issues. 
Chinese Auto Sector Commitments 
The United States and other WTO members had been highly critical of China’s 1994 Industrial 
Policy for the Automotive Sector. This policy was replaced by a new one issued by the 
government in May 2004, with provisions discouraging the importation of auto parts and 
encouraging the use of domestic technology. The U.S. view is that it is important that China fairly 
treat imports of end products, as well as parts, that can be exported competitively to its market. To 
support this view, the U.S. government filed its second WTO case ever against China on March 
30, 2006, over the issue of import tariffs on auto parts. 
The Chinese Automotive Industrial Policy of 2004 abolished many formal restrictions and 
domestic content rules. However, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) expressed concerns 
about the vague and unclear nature of many statements in the 2004 policy (such as China’s plans 
to regulate imports via its new registration system for auto manufacturers and China’s treatment 
of complete knockdown kits).76 Moreover, the 2004 policy still required foreign-owned 
assemblers in China to operate through joint ventures, in which their stake is still limited to no 
more than 50%. 
The Untied States and other countries believe that the Chinese government may be seeking to 
establish de facto policies that would restore or maintain local content rules that it was required to 
abolish as part of its WTO Accession Agreement in 2001. With respect to formal tariff rules, 
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China reduced its duties on imported cars and auto parts from much higher levels to a unified rate 
of 25% on imported vehicles and 10-14% on parts by July 1, 2006.77  
However, China has subsequently established a regulation, “Measures on Importation of Parts for 
Entire Automobiles,” which appears to have effectively re-established discrimination in favor of 
local content. Motor vehicle manufacturers are required to register their parts. If more than 60% 
of the value of a vehicle is accounted for by imported parts, the manufacturer must pay duties of 
25% on all imported parts in the vehicle.78  
According to the USTR 2009 Trade Estimates Report:  
These rules impose charges that unfairly discriminate against imported automotive parts 
and discourage automobile manufacturers in China from using imported automotive parts 
in the assembly of vehicles. In March and April 2006, the United States, the EU, and 
Canada initiated dispute settlement proceedings against China at the WTO. In March 
2008, a WTO panel ruled in favor of the United States and the other complaining parties, 
finding that China’s rules discriminate against imported auto parts and are inconsistent 
with several WTO provisions, including Article III of the GATT 1994. China appealed 
the panel’s decision to the WTO’s Appellate Body, and in December 2008 the Appellate 
Body upheld the panel’s finding that the measures are inconsistent with China’s WTO 
obligations. In January 2009, China stated that it would comply with the 
recommendations and rulings of the WTO.79 
On August 28, 2009, China announced its decision to eliminate additional charges on imported 
auto parts, effective September 1, 2009. China’s decision to comply with the WTO ruling in this 
landmark case was welcomed by the United States.80 
Another issue that has been of persistent concern has been protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPR) in China. In April 2005, after a special review of Chinese efforts to comply with its 
commitments under the WTO IPR rules, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative placed China 
on its “Priority Watch” list for insufficient IPR enforcement. The United States has not been alone 
in these complaints.81 In its 2009 Special 301 Report, the USTR states: 
China’s IPR enforcement regime remains largely ineffective and non-deterrent… The 
United States also remains concerned by reports that officials, apparently motivated by 
the financial crisis and the need to maintain jobs, are urging more lenient enforcement of 
IPR laws.82  
In April 2007, USTR brought two IPR cases against China in the WTO involving China’s IPR 
enforcement issues and its restrictions on trading rights and distribution of IPR-related products. 
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On June 22, 2009, a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled that important aspects of China’s IPR 
regime are inconsistent with its obligations under the WTO agreement. On August 12, 2009, a 
WTO panel ruled that major Chinese restrictions on the importation and distribution of copyright-
intensive products such as films, DVDs, music, books and journals is inconsistent with its WTO 
obligations.83 China said it would appeal the WTO ruling that ordered it to ease restrictions on 
imports of media products.84 
IPR issues have created problems for U.S. and other foreign automotive manufacturers operating 
in China. Most notable was GM’s case against Chery, alleging that the local automaker’s QQ 
model was a copy of the Chevrolet Spark, a minicar designed by GM’s Korean subsidiary, GM 
Daewoo. After a Chinese court in September 2005 found that the design of the Spark was never 
patented in China, GM and Chery reached a separate settlement of all issues. Although terms of 
the agreement were not disclosed, reportedly Chery has agreed not to use its company name when 
marketing cars in the United States, because of its similarity to the Chevy trade name.85 
China’s independent carmakers have variously been accused of using reverse engineering and 
copying of foreign brands and models in pursuit of growth. For the moment, it is questionable 
whether any of China’s independent automakers will be able to make a successful leap to 
international export markets, because this requires that they produce high quality automobiles and 
light trucks that meet safety standards and respect the intellectual property rights of other auto 
manufacturers. 
China Safeguard Provisions (Section 421) 
As part of the 2001 WTO accession agreement, China agreed to let the United States continue to 
treat it as a non-market economy for 12 years (codified in U.S. law under Section 421 of the 1974 
Trade Act) for the purpose of safeguards. This provision allows the United States to temporarily 
impose restrictions (quotas and/or increased tariffs) on imported Chinese products that have 
increased in such quantities that they cause, or threaten to cause, market disruption to U.S. 
domestic manufacturers. There were six Section 421 cases filed during the administration of 
George W. Bush, none resulting in sanctions being imposed under this China-specific safeguard 
provision. 
On April 20, 2009, the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied 
Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW or “United Steel Workers”) filed a 
petition with the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) claiming that certain low-priced 
U.S. imports of passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China have caused or threatened to 
cause market disruption to the domestic tire producers of similar or directly competitive items, 
and that the $1.8 billion worth of automotive tires from China had caused the loss of more than 
5,000 U.S. jobs.86 U.S. tire manufacturers did not support the case, while many tire dealers fear a 
drop-off in demand.87 
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In June 2009, the USITC announced that it had determined that such imports did cause or 
threatened to cause market disruption, and recommended that the Obama Administration to 
impose duties over three years (55% in the first year, 45% in the second, and 35% in the third). 
President Obama signed an order on September 11, 2009 to impose increased tariffs on top of an 
existing 4% duty, effective September 26, 2009. The tariff increase is 35% in the first year, 30% 
in the second year, and 25% in the third year, lower than those recommended by the USITC.88 
On September 14, 2009, China requested formal consultations at the WTO into the U.S. tariffs, 
the first step in the dispute. If China and the United are unable to resolve the issues in 60 days, 
China may seek a full review by the WTO, which could take months or years to resolve. If China 
takes such steps and a dispute panel is appointed, this would be the first time a WTO member’s 
action under the China-specific safeguard is subject to a WTO panel review.89 
Businesses and trade advocates are concerned that the issue could trigger a broader trade dispute 
which, some believe may lead to a trade war.90 On September 14, 2009, China launched an 
investigation into imports from U.S. poultry products and auto parts companies, alleging these 
imports are being unfairly dumped in the Chinese market and may also involve government 
subsidies. Although some may view China’s move as merely an act of trade retaliation, some 
trade lawyers and economists have noted that China has become increasingly sophisticated in 
applying legal strategies in trade disputes.91 
In this case, the products that China is investigating are politically sensitive in the United States, 
yet involve limited trade volume and, therefore, limited economic harm. As noted in a Financial 
Times article, “Poultry farmers are a vocal part of America’s influential farm lobby, and are 
particularly aggressive in seeking out export opportunities, because the US market is largely 
saturated. The manufacturer of cars and car parts is often heavily unionized and located in 
important Midwest states.”92 With the lop-sided trade balance between the United States and 
China, some analysts believe China potentially has much more to lose by picking a trade fight 
with the United States. 
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China Moves to Investigate U.S. Auto Subsidies 
China, reportedly, is also preparing to launch a trade investigation into whether U.S. auto makers 
are being unfairly subsidized by the U.S. government. Implicit is a threat of higher tariffs on 
imports of motor vehicles made by GM, Chrysler, and Ford.93 GM and Chrysler have received 
$60 billion from the U.S. government in loans, working capital, and other support funds, while 
Ford has received nothing. The United States exports about 30,000 vehicles to China annually, of 
which the Detroit Three account for 7,000 to 9,000.94 
Although the automobile volume in dispute is limited, China’s move appears symbolic and may 
be an attempt to turn the table on the United States, in light of the U.S. government’s support for 
carmakers, banks, and financial institutions. American labor groups and industry associations 
have long accused China of unfairly subsidizing its exporters. 
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